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Abstract
The study of mechanisms for multi-sided markets has received an increasingly growing at-
tention from the research community, and is motivated by the numerous examples of such
markets on the web and in electronic commerce, including: online advertising exchanges, stock
exchanges, business-to-business commerce and bandwidth allocation. Many of these examples
represent dynamic and uncertain environments, and thus, require, in fact, online mechanisms.
Unfortunately, as far as we know, no previously published online mechanism for a multi-sided
market (or even for a double-sided market) has managed to (approximately) maximize the gain
from trade, while guaranteeing desirable economic properties such as incentivizing truthfulness,
voluntary participation and avoiding budget deficit.
In this work we present the first online mechanism for a multi-sided market which has
the above properties. Our mechanism is designed for a market setting suggested by [Feldman
and Gonen (2016)]; which is motivated by the foreseeable future form of online advertising.
To overcome privacy concerns, the model of [Feldman and Gonen (2016)] introduces offline
user information markets through information brokers into the online advertising ecosystem,
and thus, gives users control over which parts of their data get shared in the online advertising
market. We note that both the advertisers and the information brokers are multi-minded players
in this model.
The online nature of our setting motivated us to define a stronger notion of individual ra-
tionality, called “continuous individual rationality”, capturing the natural requirement that a
player should never lose either by participating in the mechanism or by not leaving prema-
turely. Satisfying the requirements of continuous individual rationality, together with the other
economic properties our mechanism guarantees, requires the mechanism to use a novel pricing
scheme where users may be paid ongoing increments during the mechanism’s execution up to
a pre-known maximum value. As users rarely ever get paid in reality, this pricing scheme is
new to mechanism design. Nevertheless, the principle it is based on can be observed in many
common real life scenarios such as executive compensation payments and company acquisition
deals. We believe both our new dynamic pricing scheme concept and our strengthened notion
of individual rationality are of independent interest.
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from trade maximization
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1 Introduction
Mechanisms for multi-sided markets are given an increasingly growing focus in the research com-
munity. The study of such mechanisms is motivated by the continuous growth in the number of
transactions and exchanges, and the need for competitiveness, which promotes adoption of new
exchange mechanisms. Among the numerous examples of multi-sided markets on the web and
in electronic commerce one can find: online advertising exchanges, stock exchanges, business-to-
business commerce and bandwidth allocation. Many of these examples represent dynamic and
uncertain environments, which led to an interest in online exchange mechanisms.
A natural expectation from an online exchange mechanism is to (approximately) maximize the
gain from trade, while guaranteeing desirable economic properties such as incentivizing truthfulness,
voluntary participation and avoiding budget deficit. Unfortunately, as far as we know, no previous
work has managed to achieve these goals simultaneously. Wurman et al. [27] presented a mechanism
incentivizing truthful reporting from either the buyers or the sellers, but not simultaneously from
both. A different mechanism given by Blum et al. [6] maximizes the social welfare of buyers and
non-selling sellers (as opposed to maximizing the gain from trade). Finally, Bredin et al. [7] present a
truthful online double-sided auction that is constructed from a truthful offline double-sided auction
rule. However, the competitiveness of [7]’s mechanism with respect to the optimal trade was only
studied empirically.
The failure of the above works to maximize the gain from trade while maintaining truthfulness,
individual rationality (voluntary participation) and budget balance (avoiding budget deficit) can
be partially attributed to an impossibility result of [22]. This impossibility result states that,
even in an offline setting involving a single buyer and a single seller, maximizing the gain from
trade while maintaining truthfulness and individual rationality perforce runs a deficit (i.e., is not
budget balanced). An additional reason for the above failure is that the matching problem faced
by the market maker (exchange mechanism) in multi-sided online markets combines elements of
online algorithms and sequential decision making with considerations from mechanism design. More
specifically, unlike in a traditional online algorithm, a mechanism for such a setting must provide
incentives for players to report truthful information to the mechanism. On the other hand, unlike
in traditional mechanism design, this is a dynamic setting with players that arrive over time, and
the mechanism must deal with uncertainty and make irrevocable decisions before the arrival of all
the players.
In this work we present the first1 online mechanism for a multi-sided market setting which guar-
antees the economic properties of truthfulness, individual rationality, and budget balance while (ap-
proximately) maximizing the gain from trade. Specifically, we consider a market setting presented
by [12]. This setting is motivated by online advertising in its foreseeable future form. Online ad-
vertising currently supports some of the most important Internet services, including: search, social
media and user generated content sites. For online advertising to be effective, companies collect
vast amounts of information about users, which increasingly creates privacy concerns. As these
concerns are especially pronounced in the European society, EU regulators have actively been look-
ing for ways to improve users’ privacy. One such way, which was suggested by the EU regulators,
is development of tools that enable the end user to choose which parts of their private information
online advertising platforms are allowed to collect.
The market setting suggested by [12] based on this motivation includes advertisers as buyers,
users as sellers (each willing to sell her own information portfolio through a broker) and information
brokers as mediators representing the users. The objective of a mechanism for this setting is to
1To the best of our knowledge.
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end up with a match between users and advertisers maximizing the gain from trade. Towards that
goal, the mechanism has to collect information from the mediators and advertisers; and thus, needs
to incentivize the mediators and advertisers to report truthfully, which it can do by charging the
advertisers and paying the mediators. Additionally, the mechanism can also recommend for the
mediators to forward some of the payment they receive to the users, which allows the mechanism
to affect the incentives of the users as well.
In order to convert the above offline setting suggested by [12] into an online setting, we assume
the mediators and advertisers arrive at a uniformly random order, and refer to the arriving ad-
vertisers and mediators as arriving entities. Every time that a new entity arrives, the mechanism
has an opportunity to assign users to advertisers. More specifically, when a mediator arrives the
mechanism is allowed to assign users of the newly arriving mediator to advertisers that have already
arrived. Similarly, when an advertiser arrives the mechanism is allowed to assign users of media-
tors that have already arrived to the newly arriving advertiser. Notice that this means that the
mechanism is not allowed to cancel assignments that have already been made, or assign a user of
a mediators that has already arrived to an advertiser that has already arrived. These restrictions,
together with the random arrival order, represent the online nature of the setting. We note that
our choice to model an online market using a random arrival order is a well established practice
(see [3, 5, 26] for a few examples). Intuitively, this modeling choice is based on the assumption that
real arrival orders are arbitrary rather than adversarial.
The online nature of our setting raises the question of what it means for a mechanism to be
individually rational. As usual, individual rationality should imply that a player never losses by par-
ticipating. However, in an online setting it is natural to require also that a player never losses by not
leaving prematurely. We introduce a new concept called “continuous individual rationality” which
captures the above intuitive requirement. Satisfying the requirements of continuous individual ra-
tionality, together with the other economic properties our mechanism guarantees, requires the mech-
anism to use a novel pricing scheme where users may be paid ongoing increments during the mecha-
nism’s execution. The maximum total payment that a user may end up with is pre-known (when the
user arrives), however, the actual increments are not pre-know and depend on the market’s online
changing demands and supplies. As users rarely ever get paid in reality, this pricing scheme is new
to mechanism design and might look odd at first glance. Nevertheless, the principle it is based on
can be observed in many common real life scenarios such as executive compensation payments and
company acquisition deals. For example, the eBay acquisition of Skype in 2005 involved both an up-
front payment and an additional payment whose amount depended on the future performance of the
bought company (https://investors.ebayinc.com/releasedetail.cfm?releaseid=176402).
It is interesting to note that the setting of [12] involves multi-minded players (the advertisers
and mediators), i.e., players with a multi-dimensional strategic space. The mechanisms suggested
by [12] for this setting are the only known mechanisms, to date, which circumvent the impossibility
result of [22] in a model involving multi-minded players. Our result shows that it is possible to
handle multi-minded players also in an online setting.
1.1 Our Result
As discussed above, we extend the standard concept of individual rationality in a way that seems
to match better the intuitive meaning of individual rationality in an online setting. Specifically,
we say that a mechanism is continuously individually rational for a player (a user, a mediator or
an advertiser) if the player’s utility can only increase over time when the player is truthful2. In
2Informally, a player is truthful if he/she reports the information as it is known to him/her. A formal definition
of what does it mean for a user, mediator or advertiser to be truthful is given in Section 2.
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other words, the utility of the player is always 0 before the arrival of the first entity. After the
arrival of each entity the mechanism updates the assignment and payments, which can affect the
player’s utility. If the change in the utility is always non-negative when the player is truthful, then
the mechanism is continuously individually rational for the player. Note that the newly presented
concept of continuous individual rationality is a stronger concept than individual rationality in
its classic form as it requires two things. First, ex post individual rationality, i.e., the players are
never worse off when the mechanism terminates, compared to their situation before the mechanism’s
execution. Second, it is individually rational for a player to remain throughout the execution of
the mechanism, i.e., each individual step during the execution can only increase the utilities of the
players.
Like in [4, 12], we say that a mechanism is user-side incentive compatible if truthfulness is a
dominant strategy3 for each user given that her mediator is truthful (regardless of any parameter of
the model, such as the number of mediators, and regardless of the other players’ strategies). Simi-
larly, the mechanism is user-side continuously individually rational if it is continuously individually
rational for each user given that her mediator is truthful (again regardless of any parameters and
regardless of other players’ strategies). A mechanism is mediator-side incentive compatible if truth-
fulness is a dominant strategy for each mediator whose users are all truthful, and it is mediator-side
continuously individually rational if it is continuously individually rational for every such media-
tor (again regardless of any parameters or other players’ strategies). Finally, a mechanism is
advertiser-side incentive compatible if truthfulness is a dominant strategy for every advertiser, and
it is advertiser-side continuously individually rational if it is continuously individually rational for
every advertiser. We construct a mechanism which is three-sided incentive compatible (i.e., it is si-
multaneously user-side incentive compatible, mediator-side incentive compatible and advertiser-side
incentive compatible) and also three-sided continuously individually rational (i.e., it is simultane-
ously user-side continuously individually rational, mediator-side continuously individually rational
and advertiser-side continuously individually rational).
Our mechanism is termed “Observe and Price Mechanism” (OPM). The following theorem ana-
lyzes the economic properties guaranteed by OPM and its competitive ratio. The parameter α is an
upper bound, known to the mechanism, on the market importance of any single player. Formally, α
bounds the ratio between the size of the optimal trade and the maximum capacity of an advertiser
or the maximum number of users that a mediator can represent. For large markets, such as the
market motivating our work, α is expected to be much smaller than 1.
Theorem 1.1. OPM is budget balanced4, three-sided continuously individually rational, three-sided
incentive compatible and (1− 9.5 6√α− 10e−2/ 3
√
α)-competitive.
Note that our mechanism is randomized, but is guaranteed, by its three-sided incentive compat-
ibility, to be truthful for all possible random coin flips. This stands in contrast to many randomized
mechanisms from the literature, which are typically proven to be truthful only in expectation or
with high probability.
1.2 Additional Related Work
Our setting is based on the model of [12]. From a motivational point of view this model is closely
related to works that involve mediators and online advertising markets, such as [2, 11, 24]. The
3Here and throughout the paper, a reference to domination of strategies should be understood as a reference to
weak domination. We never refer to strong domination.
4A mechanism is budget balanced if the amount it charges (from the advertisers) is at least as large as the amount
it pays (to the mediators).
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models studied by these works are motivated by the current networks exchanges for online display
ads, where advertisers buy through mediators (the networks) which in turn buy goods (publishing
space) from a single seller. Despite their motivation by a network exchange, these models are actu-
ally auctions (i.e., one-sided mechanisms). Moreover, they focus on offline mechanisms maximizing
revenue, which is very different from the focus of our work. See [12] for additional works related to
their model, and in particular to the study of mediators.
The uniformly random arrival order of the entities in our setting relates it to the vast literature
on the secretary problem. The original form of the secretary problem first appeared around the
1960’s, although its exact origin remains unclear [10, 15, 21]. In this form, the problem asks to
select online the maximum value element among a set of elements arriving at a uniformly random
order. Connections found between various extensions of the secretary problem and mechanism
design have motivated an extensive study of these extensions over the last decade (for an excellent
survey on these extensions see [9]). One extension of the secretary problem which is particularly
relevant to our work is an extension in which the arriving elements are the right side nodes of a
bipartite graph whose left side is known to the algorithm. The algorithm then have to construct
a maximum weight matching online. More specifically, for every arriving right side node the
algorithm must decide, immediately and irrevocably, whether to assign it to a left side node, and
if so to which one. Kesselheim et al. [20] describe a e−1-competitive algorithm for this extension
of the secretary problem. Our own setting can be viewed as a variant of this extension involving
strategic considerations.
Our presented mechanism is composed of two phases: an observation phase in which the algo-
rithm collects information but makes no assignments, and a matching phase. This partition of the
mechanism into two phases is similar to the structure found in many algorithms for the secretary
problem and its extensions. Moreover, within the literature on algorithmic game theory, an analog
for the observation phase can be found in the work of Goldberg et al. [18] who described random
sampling auctions in which an observed (sampled) set is used in order to compute a threshold for
the remaining players. It is important to note, however, that, unlike in our work, [18] focuses on
one-sided online auctions with unlimited supply.
In addition to the above described extension of the secretary problem, there has been a signifi-
cant body of works studying online matching problems with an adversarial arrival order. This body
of work was originated by the work of Karp et al. [19] who described an optimal online algorithm
for unweighted bipartite online matching. Later works considered more general settings allowing
various kinds of weights (see, for example, [1, 8, 17]). We note that these works do not refer to
strategic considerations despite the fact that they are mostly motivated by online advertisement
markets.
Last but not least, we would like to mention matching markets, which are a model related to
double-sided auctions—though without money. There is extensive literature on online matching
markets. The classic matching algorithm is the deferred acceptance algorithm [16]. This algorithm
is truthful for one side of the market, and produces a stable match with respect to reported
preferences. Moreover, it is known that there does not exist a stable matching mechanism that
is truthful for all players [23]. Readers are referred to [25] for more background on the matching
markets literature.
2 Model and Definitions
Let us now present the exact details of the model we consider. The model consists of a set P of
users, a set M of mediators, and a set A of advertisers. Each user p ∈ P has a non-negative cost
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c(p) which she suffers if she is assigned to an advertiser; thus, the utility of p is 0 if she is not
assigned and t− c(p) if she is assigned and paid t. The users are partitioned among the mediators,
and we denote by P (m) ⊆ P the set of users associated with mediator m ∈ M (i.e., the sets
{P (m) | m ∈ M} form a disjoint partition of P ). The utility of a mediator m ∈M is the amount
he is paid minus the total cost his users suffer; hence, if x(p) ∈ {0, 1} is an indicator for the event
that user p ∈ P (m) is assigned and t is the payment received by m (part of which might have been
forwarded by the mediator to his users), then the utility of m is t −∑p∈P (m) x(p) · c(p). Finally,
each advertiser a ∈ A has a positive capacity u(a), and she gains a non-negative value v(a) from
every one of the first u(a) users assigned to her; thus, if advertiser a is assigned n ≤ u(a) users and
has to pay t then her utility is n · v(a) − t.
As explained in Section 1, we assume the entities (i.e., the mediators and advertisers) arrive at
a uniformly random order. A mechanism for this model knows the total number of entities5, and
views the entities as they arrive; however, it has no prior knowledge about the parameters of the
entities or about the users. To compensate for this lack of knowledge, each arriving entity reports
information to the mechanism. Each advertiser reports her capacity and value. The reports of the
mediators are formed in a slightly more involved way. Each user reports her cost to her mediator,
and based on these reports each mediator reports the number of his users and their costs to the
mechanism. The users, mediators and advertisers are all strategic, and thus, free to produce
incorrect reports. In other words, an advertiser may report incorrect capacity and value, a user
may report an incorrect cost and a mediator may report any number of users and associate with
each one of them an arbitrary cost.
Every time that a new entity arrives, the mechanism has an opportunity to assign users to
advertisers. More specifically, when a mediator arrives the mechanism is allowed to assign users of
the newly arriving mediator to advertisers that have already arrived. Similarly, when an advertiser
arrives the mechanism is allowed to assign users of mediators that have already arrived to the
newly arriving advertiser. The objective of the mechanism is to end up with an assignment of
users to advertisers maximizing the gain from trade. In order to incentivize the mediators and
advertisers to report truthfully, the mechanism may charge the advertisers and pay the mediators.
Additionally, the mechanism is also allowed to recommend for each mediator how much of the
payment he received to forward to each one of his user. It is important to observe that the utility
function of the mediators is not affected by the forwarding of payments to the users, and thus, it
is reasonable to believe that mediators follow the forwarding recommendations.
We say that a user is truthful if she reports her true cost. Similarly, an advertiser is truthful
if she reports her true capacity and value. Finally, a mediator is considered truthful if he reports
to the mechanism his true number of users and the costs of the users as reported to him; and,
in addition, he also pays the users according to the recommendation of the mechanism (in other
words, he lets them know about their true balance).
Similarly to the practice of [12], we associate a set B(a) of u(a) slots with each advertiser a ∈ A.
This allows us to think of the users as assigned to slots instead of directly to advertisers. Formally,
let B be the set of all slots (i.e., B =
⋃
a∈AB(a)), then an assignment is a set S ⊆ B ×P in which
no user or slot appears in more than one ordered pair. We say that an assignment S assigns a user
p to slot b if (p, b) ∈ S. Similarly, we say that an assignment S assigns user p to advertiser a if
there exists a slot b ∈ B(a) such that (p, b) ∈ S. It is also useful to define values for the slots. For
every slot b of advertiser a, we define the value v(b) of b as equal to the value v(a) of a. Using this
5In some cases the assumption that the mechanism has a prior knowledge about the number of entities might
be considered unnatural. The mechanism we present can be modified using standard techniques to work with an
alternative assumption stating that each entity arrives at a uniformly random time from some range (for example,
[0, 1]). We refer the reader to [13] for more details about the relation between these assumptions.
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notation, the gain from trade of assignment S can be stated as:
GfT(S) =
∑
(p,b)∈S
[v(b) − c(p)] .
Finally, we would like to define two additional shorthands that we use occasionally. Given a set
A′ ⊆ A of advertisers, we denote by B(A′) = ⋃a∈A′ B(a) the set of slots belonging to advertisers
of A′. Similarly, given a set M ′ ⊆ M of mediators, P (M ′) = ⋃m∈M ′ P (m) is the set of users
associated with mediators of M ′.
2.1 Comparison of Costs and Values
The presentation of our mechanism is simpler when the values of slots and the costs of users are
all unique. Clearly, this is extremely unrealistic since all the slots of a given advertiser have the
exact same value in our model. Thus, we simulate uniqueness using a tie-breaking rule. The rule
we assume works as follows:
• The mechanism chooses an arbitrary order on the mediators and advertisers. It is important
that this order is chosen independently of the reports received by the mechanism and the
arrival order of the entities (if there is no natural order that can be used, the mechanism
can simply choose a uniformly random order). The mechanism then uses this order to break
ties when comparing users to slots and when comparing between users (slots) associated with
different mediators (advertisers). For example, when comparing the cost of user p with the
value of a slot b, the mechanism breaks ties in favor of p if and only if the mediator of p
appears earlier than the advertiser of b in the chosen order.
• We assume that the report of every mediator induces some order on the set of users of this
mediators. The mechanism uses this order to break ties between the costs of users belonging
to the same mediator.
• Finally, since the slots of a given advertiser are all identical and non-strategic (recall that
slots were introduced into the model just for the purpose of simplifying the presentation),
any method can be used for tie-breaking between the slots of a given advertiser.
In the rest of this paper, whenever costs/values are compared the comparison is assumed to use
the above tie breaking rule. Note that this assumption implies that two values (costs) are equal if
and only if they belong to the same slot (user); moreover, the value of a slot is never equal to the
cost of a user.
2.2 Canonical Assignment
Given a set B′ ⊆ B of users and a set P ′ ⊆ P of slots, the canonical assignment Sc(P ′, B′) is the
assignment constructed by the following process. First, we order the slots of B′ in a decreasing
value order b1, b2, . . . , b|B′| and the users of P ′ in an increasing cost order p1, p2, . . . , p|P ′|. Then, for
every 1 ≤ i ≤ min{|B′|, |P ′|} the canonical assignment Sc(B′, P ′) assigns user pi to slot bi if and
only if v(bi) > c(pi).
The canonical assignment is an important tool we use often in the next section. In some places
we refer to the user or slot at location i of a canonical assignment Sc(P
′, B′), by which we mean
user pi or slot bi, respectively. Additionally, the size |Sc(P,B)| of the canonical assignment Sc(P,B)
is used very often in our proofs, and thus, it is useful to define the shorthand τ = |Sc(P,B)|.
The following lemma, which was proved by [12], shows that the canonical assignment is always
an optimal assignment.
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Lemma 2.1 (Lemma 2.2 of [12]). The canonical assignment Sc(P
′, B′) maximizes GfT(Sc(P ′, B′))
among all the possible assignments of users of P ′ to slots of B′.
3 Our Mechanism
In this section we describe our online mechanism “Observe and Price Mechanism” (OPM). OPM
assumes |Sc(P,B)| > 0, and that there exists a value α ∈ [|Sc(P,B)|−1, 1], known to the mechanism,
such that we are guaranteed that:
u(a)
|Sc(P,B)| ≤ α ∀ a ∈ A and
|P (m)|
|Sc(P,B)| ≤ α ∀ m ∈M .
In other words, α is an upper bound on how large can the capacity of an advertiser or the number
of users of a mediator be compared to the size of the optimal assignment Sc(P,B). We remind the
reader that α can be informally understood as a bound on the market importance of every single
advertiser or mediator.
A description of OPM is given as Mechanism 1. Notice that Mechanism 1 accepts a parameter
r ∈ (0, 1/2] whose value is specified later. Additionally, Mechanism 1 often refers to parameters of
the model that are not known to the mechanism, such as the value of an advertiser or the number of
users of a mediator. Whenever this happens, this should be understood as referring to the reported
values of these parameters.
Mechanism 1: Observe and Price Mechanism (OPM)
1. Draw a random value t from the binomial distribution B(|A| + |M |, r), and observe the first
t entities that arrive without assigning any users. Let AT and MT be the set of the observed
advertisers and mediators, respectively. More formally, if T is the set of the first t entities that
arrived, then AT = A ∩ T and MT = M ∩ T . We later refer to this step of the mechanism as
the “observation phase”.
2. Let pˆ and bˆ be the user and slot at location ⌈(1 − 2r−1 · 3√α) · |Sc(P (MT ), B(AT ))|⌉ of the
canonical assignment Sc(P (MT ), B(AT )). If (1− 2r−1 · 3
√
α) · |Sc(P (MT ), B(AT ))| ≤ 0, then the
previous definition of pˆ and bˆ cannot be used. Instead define pˆ as a dummy user of cost −∞
and bˆ as a dummy slot of value ∞. We say that a slot b or a user p corresponding to an entity
that arrived after the observation phase is assignable if v(b) > v(bˆ) or c(p) < c(pˆ), respectively.
3. Let σE be the sequence of the entities that arrived so far after the observation phase. Initially
σE is empty, and entities are added to it as they arrive.
4. For every arriving entity:
a. Add the new entity to the end of σE .
b. If the arriving entity is a mediator m, then, as long as m has unassigned assignable users
and there is an advertiser in σE having unassigned assignable slots, do the following:
• Let a be the earliest advertiser in σE having unassigned assignable slots.
• Assign the unassigned assignable user of m with the lowest cost to an arbitrary unassigned
assignable slot of a, charge an amount of v(bˆ) from advertiser a and pay c(pˆ) to mediator
m.
c. If the arriving entity is an advertiser a, then, as long as a has unassigned assignable slots
and there is a mediator in σE having unassigned assignable users, do the following:
• Let m be the earliest mediator in σE having unassigned assignable users.
• Assign the unassigned assignable user of m with the lowest cost to an arbitrary assignable
slot of a, charge an amount of v(bˆ) from advertiser a and pay c(pˆ) to mediator m.
7
d. For every mediator m ∈ σE, recommend m to transfer his assigned users an additional
amount that guarantees the following:
• If all the assignable users of m are assigned to slots, then the additional amount should
increase the total payment received so far by each assigned user of m to c(pˆ).
• Otherwise, let p be the unassigned assignable user ofm with the minimum cost. In this case
the additional amount should increase the total payment received so far by each assigned
user of m to c(p).6
We would like to note that OPM is based on a mechanism of [12] named “Threshold by Partition
Mechanism”, and the analyses of both mechanisms go along similar lines. However, OPM introduces
additional ideas that allow it to work in an online setting. In particular, OPM uses an involved
recommended payments updating rule that keeps it three-sided continuously individually rational.
Moreover, OPM is able to use an observation phase whose size is a small fraction of the entire input
(for α≪ 1), whereas the analysis of the original mechanism of [12] relies on the symmetry properties
induced by an even partition of the input (which is inappropriate in an online setting).
Let us start the analysis of OPM with the following simple observation, which shows that OPM
obeys the restriction of our model on the way a mechanism may update its assignment.
Observation 3.1. Each time OPM assigns a user to a slot, either the user belongs to the newly
arrived mediator or the slot belongs to the newly arrived advertiser.
Our objective in the rest of this section is to prove Theorem 1.1. In fact, we prove the following
restatement of the theorem, which implies the original statement of the theorem from Section 1.1.
Theorem 1.1. OPM is budget balanced, three-sided continuously individually rational, three-sided
incentive compatible and (1−r−22r−1 · 3√α−10e−2/ 3
√
α)-competitive. Hence, for r = min{1/2, 4 6√α}
the competitive ratio of OPM is at least: 1− 9.5 6√α− 10e−2/ 3
√
α.
One part of Theorem 1.1 (i.e., that OPM is budget balanced) is proved by the following obser-
vation.
Observation 3.2. OPM is budget balanced.
Proof. We show that whenever OPM assigns a user p to a slot b, it charges the advertiser of b more
than it pays the mediator of p. Consider an arbitrary ordered pair (p, b) from the assignment
produced by OPM. The fact that p is assigned implies that c(p) < c(pˆ), and thus, pˆ is not a dummy
user (since c(pˆ) = −∞ when pˆ is a dummy user). Similarly, the fact that a user is assigned to b
implies that v(b) > v(bˆ), and thus, bˆ is not a dummy slot (since v(bˆ) =∞ when bˆ is a dummy slot).
Recall that the fact that pˆ and bˆ are not dummy user and slot, respectively, implies that pˆ and
bˆ are matched by the canonical assignment Sc(P (MT ), B(AT )). Since a canonical assignment never
assigns a user p′ to a slot b′ when c(p′) > v(b′), we get: c(pˆ) < v(bˆ). The proof now completes by
observing that the advertiser of b is charged v(bˆ) for the assignment of p to b, and the mediator of
p is paid only c(pˆ) for the assignment of p to b.
Following is a useful observation about OPM that we occasionally use in the next proofs.
Observation 3.3. OPM preserves the invariant that one of the following is always true immediately
after OPM processes the arrival of an entity:
6Note that at every point in time m is budget balanced since he receives a payment of c(pˆ) for each one of his
assigned users, and the total amount recommended for him to pay to each one of these users is either c(pˆ) or equal
to the cost of some assignable user (and thus, is upper bounded by c(pˆ)).
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1. OPM assigned all the assignable users of mediators that have already arrived.
2. OPM assigned users to all the assignable slots of advertisers that have already arrived.
Proof. Clearly the invariant holds during the observation phase because only mediators and ad-
vertisers that arrive after the observation phase contribute assignable users and slots, respectively.
Next, assume the invariant held before the arrival of some mediator m which arrives after the
observation phase, and let us prove that it holds also after the arrival of m. If before the arrival of
m case (2) of the invariant held, then this case also holds after the arrival of m since m contributes
no new slots. On the other hand, if case (1) held before the arrival of m, then OPM assigns the
assignable users of m to assignable slots of advertisers that have already arrived till one of two
things happen: either all the assignable slots of advertisers that have already arrived get assigned
(and thus, case (2) of the invariant now holds), or all the assignable users of m get assigned (and
thus, case (1) of the invariant holds again). It remains to prove that if the invariant held before
the arrival of an advertiser a which arrives after the observation phase, then it also holds after her
arrival. However, this proof is analogous to the above proof for mediators, and thus, we omit it.
3.1 The Incentive Properties of OPM
In this section we prove the incentive parts of Theorem 1.1. Specifically, we prove three lem-
mata showing that OPM is three-sided continuously individually rational and three-sided incentive
compatible. The first lemma analyzes the incentive properties of OPM for users.
Lemma 3.4. For every user p, assuming the mediator m of p is truthful, OPM is continuously
individually rational for p, and truthfulness is a dominant strategy for her.
Proof. If m arrives during the observation phase (i.e., m ∈MT ), then no user of m is ever assigned
to a slot or paid. Hence, the lemma is trivial in this case. Thus, we assume in the rest of the proof
that m arrives after the observation phase.
Note that OPM calculates the threshold c(pˆ) based on the reports of advertisers and mediators in
AT and MT , respectively. Thus, p, who is associated with a mediator not belonging to MT , cannot
affect this threshold. Next, let us denote by k the number of users of m that are assigned to slots
when p reports a cost smaller than c(pˆ). We claim that k is independent of the exact cost reported
by p, as long as this cost is smaller than c(pˆ). The reason for that is that most of the time OPM
accesses the reported cost of p only by checking whether p is assignable, and the answer for that
check does not change as long as the reported cost of p is smaller than c(pˆ). The exact value of
c(p) is only used by OPM after OPM decides to assign some user of m to a slot, and then this exact
value is used to decide which user of m will be assigned to the slot—which does not affect k.
Let p′ be the user of m with the kth smallest cost among his users that are not p. If m does
not have k users other than p, then p′ is a dummy user of cost ∞. In the rest of the proof we show
that p is assigned to a slot if and only if she reports a cost smaller than min{c(pˆ), c(p′)}. Moreover,
when p is assigned to a slot the total payment she gets is this minimum (which is her critical value).
Clearly, the incentive compatability of OPM for p follows immediately from this claim.
Let us begin proving the above claim by showing that p is left unassigned when she reports a
cost larger than min{c(pˆ), c(p′)}. There are two cases to consider. If p reports a cost larger than
c(pˆ) then she is not assignable, and thus, she is left unassigned. On the other hand, consider the
case that p reports a value smaller than c(pˆ), but larger than c(p′). In this case p is not one of the
k users of m with the smallest reported costs, and thus, she is again left unassigned.
Next, we prove the other side of the above claim, i.e., that when p reports a cost smaller than
min{c(pˆ), c(p′)} she is assigned and the total payment she gets is this minimum. The fact that p
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reports a value smaller than c(pˆ) implies that p is assignable, and the fact that she reports a value
smaller than c(p′) guarantees that p is one of the k users of m with the smallest reported costs.
This already guarantees that p is assigned to some slot, and that p′ is the unassigned user of m
with the smallest cost when OPM updates for the last time the recommended total payment from m
to p (unless p′ is a dummy user). Hence, the recommended total payment for p is determined as
follows. If p′ is assignable (i.e., c(p′) < c(pˆ)), then the recommended total payment for p is set to
c(p′). Otherwise, m has no unassigned assignable users, and thus, the recommended total payment
to p is set to c(pˆ) < c(p′).
It remains to prove that OPM is continuously individually rational for p, i.e., that the utility of p
can only increase over time when p is truthful. The first time the utility of p might change is when
p is assigned. When this happens p is immediately payed an amount equal either to c(pˆ) or to the
cost of an unassigned assignable user of m. Since OPM chooses the user to assign as the unassigned
assignable user of m with the lowest cost, both possible payments are larger than c(p), and thus,
the utility of p does not become negative following the assignment of p. Next, we prove that the
recommended total payment for p can only increase over time, which proves that p’s utility can
only increase from the moment p is assigned. To see why that is true, recall that, at every time
point in which OPM updates the recommended total payment to p, this total payment is updated
to be either the cost of the unassigned assignable user of m with the lowest cost, or c(pˆ) if m has
no unassigned assignable users left. As long as m has unassigned assignable users this update rule
yields a recommended total payment which can only increase over time since users occasionally get
removed from the set of unassigned assignable users of m (when they get assigned), but no user is
ever added to this set. Moreover, the recommended total payment to p also increases when the last
unassigned assignable user of m gets assigned since the recommended total payment to p before
this point was equal to the cost of some assignable user of m, which is smaller, by definition, than
the new recommended total payment c(pˆ).
The next lemma analyzes the incentive properties of OPM for mediators.
Lemma 3.5. For every mediator m, assuming the users of m are truthful, OPM is continuously
individually rational for m, and truthfulness is a dominant strategy for him.
Proof. If m arrives during the observation phase (i.e., m ∈MT ), then no user of m is ever assigned
to a slot and m receives no payment. Hence, the lemma is trivial in this case. Thus, we assume in
the rest of the proof that m arrives after the observation phase.
Note that OPM calculates the threshold c(pˆ) based on the reports of advertisers and mediators
in AT and MT , respectively. Thus, m, who does not belong to MT , cannot affect this threshold.
Whenever a user p ∈ P (m) is assigned to a slot the utility of m (and the user) decreases by c(p)
and increases by the additional payment m gets, which is c(pˆ). In other words, the utility of m
changes by c(pˆ) − c(p) (independently of the amount m forwards to p). When m is truthful this
change is always non-negative since the fact that p was assigned implies that she is assignable,
i.e., her reported cost is smaller than c(pˆ). This already proves that each assignment of a user of
m increases his utility by a non-negative amount when he is truthful (assuming his users are also
truthful), and thus, OPM is continuously individually rational for m.
Let s be the number of assignable users of m, according to his report. We claim that there exists
a value k which is independent of the report of m such that for any report of m the mechanism
assigns the min{k, s} users of m with the lowest reported costs. Before proving this claim, let us
explain why the lemma follows from this claim. The above description shows that the utility of
m changes by a c(pˆ) − c(p) for every assigned user p ∈ P (m), thus, m wishes to assign as many
as possible users having cost less than c(pˆ), and if he cannot assign all of them then he prefers
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to assign the users with the lowest costs. By being truthful m guarantees that only users of cost
less than c(pˆ) are considered assignable, and thus, have a chance to be assigned. Moreover, by the
above claim OPM assigns the k assignable users of m with the lowest costs (or all of them if s < k),
which is the best result m can hope for given that at most k of his users can be assigned. Hence,
truthfulness is a dominant strategy for m.
We are only left to prove the above claim. Note that Observation 3.3 implies that OPM assigns
no users of m as long as there are mediators appearing earlier in σE which still have unassigned
assignable users. Once there are no more such mediators, OPM assigns users of m, in an increasing
costs order, to unassigned assignable slots till one of two things happens: either m runs out of
unassigned assignable users, or the input for OPM ends. This means that when the input for OPM
ends before all the assignable users of mediators appearing before m in σE are assigned, then no
users of m are assigned and the claim holds with k = 0. Otherwise, we choose k to be the number of
unassigned assignable slots immediately before OPM assigns the first user of m (we count in k both
unassigned assignable slots of advertisers that have already arrived at this moment and unassigned
assignable slots of advertisers that arrive later). Notice that the report of m does not affect the
behavior of OPM up to the moment it starts assigning users of m, and thus, k is independent of the
report of m. If s > k, then the k users of m with the lowest costs are assigned before OPM runs out
of input and stops. Otherwise, if s ≤ k then OPM stops assigning users of m only after assigning all
the assignable users of m, and thus, all the s assignable users of m get assigned.
Finally, the next lemma considers the incentive properties of OPM for advertisers. The proof of
this lemma is analogous to the proof of the previous lemma (with slots exchanging roles with users,
v(bˆ) exchanging roles with c(pˆ), etc.), and thus, we omit it.
Lemma 3.6. For every advertiser a, OPM is continuously individually rational for a, and truthful-
ness is a dominant strategy for her.
3.2 The Competitive Ratio of OPM
In this section we analyze the competitive ratio of OPM. Recall that τ was defined as a shorthand for
|Sc(P,B)|. We now define P˜ (B˜) as the set of the users (slots) at locations 1 to ⌈(1−6r−1 · 3
√
α)τ⌉ of
the canonical assignment Sc(P,B) (P˜ and B˜ are defined to be empty when 1−6r−1 · 3
√
α ≤ 0). The
following observation shows that most of the gain from trade of the canonical assignment Sc(P,B)
comes from the users and slots of P˜ and B˜, respectively. For convenience, let us denote by Po the
set of users that are assigned by Sc(P,B), and by Bo the set of slots that are assigned some user
by Sc(P,B).
Observation 3.7.
∑
b∈B˜ v(b)−
∑
p∈P˜ c(p) ≥ (1− 6r−1 · 3
√
α) · GfT(Sc(P,B)).
Proof. If 1 − 6r−1 · 3√α ≤ 0, then both B˜ and P˜ are empty, and the inequality that we need to
prove holds since its left hand side is 0 and its right hand side is non-positive (recall that Sc(P,B)
is an assignment of users from P to slots of B maximizing the gain from trade, and thus, its gain
from trade is at least 0 since GfT(∅) = 0). Thus, we may assume in the rest of the proof that
1− 6r−1 · 3√α > 0.
Since B˜ contains the ⌈(1− 6r−1 · 3√α)τ⌉ slots with the largest values among the slots of Bo, we
get:
∑
b∈B˜
v(b) ≥ ⌈(1 − 6r−1 · 3√α)τ⌉ ·
∑
b∈Bo v(b)
τ
.
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Similarly, since P˜ contains the ⌈(1 − 6r−1 · 3√α)τ⌉ users with the lowest costs among the users of
Po, we get:
∑
p∈A˜
c(p) ≤ ⌈(1 − 6r−1 · 3√α)τ⌉ ·
∑
c∈Po c(p)
τ
.
Combining the two inequities gives:
∑
b∈B˜
v(b)−
∑
p∈P˜
c(p) ≥ ⌈(1 − 6r−1 · 3√α)τ⌉ ·
∑
b∈Bo v(b)−
∑
p∈Po c(p)
τ
= ⌈(1 − 6r−1 · 3√α)τ⌉ · GfT(Sc(P,B))
τ
≥ (1− 6r−1 · 3√α) · GfT(Sc(P,B)) .
Observation 3.7 shows that one can prove a competitive ratio for OPM by relating the gain from
trade of the assignment it produces to the gain from trade obtained by assigning the users of P˜ to
the slots B˜. The following lemma is a key lemma we use to relate the two gains. In order to state
this lemma we need some additional definitions. Consider the following two sets.
Pˆ = {p ∈ P (M \MT ) | c(p) < c(pˆ)} and Bˆ = {b ∈ B(A \AT ) | v(b) > v(bˆ)} .
Intuitively, Pˆ is the set of the assignable users, and Bˆ is the set of the assignable slots. It is
important to note that Pˆ and Bˆ are both empty whenever pˆ and bˆ are dummy user and slot,
respectively. We also define two additional sets AL and ML as follows. Let f be a random variable
distributed according to the binomial distribution B(|A \AT |+ |M \MT |,min{16r−1 · 3
√
α, 1}), and
let L be the set of the last f entities in σE (or equivalently, the last f entities to arrive). The sets
AL and ML are then defined as AL = A ∩ L and ML = M ∩ L.
Lemma 3.8. There exists an event E of probability at least 1 − 10e−2/ 3
√
α such that E implies the
following:
(i) B˜ \B(AT ) ⊆ Bˆ (iii) |Pˆ \ P (ML)| ≤ |Bˆ|
(ii) P˜ \ P (MT ) ⊆ Pˆ (iv) |Bˆ \B(AL)| ≤ |Pˆ |
(v) c(p) ≤ ℓ(P,B) ≤ v(b) for every user p ∈ Pˆ and slot b ∈ Bˆ, where
ℓ(P,B) is a value which is independent of the random coins of OPM
and obeys c(p) ≤ ℓ(P,B) ≤ v(b) for every p ∈ Po and b ∈ Bo.
The proof of Lemma 3.8 is very similar to the proof of Lemma 4.6 in [12], and thus, we defer
it to Appendix A. In the rest of this section we explain how the competitive ratio of OPM follows
from Lemma 3.8. Let Sˆ be the assignment produced by OPM.
Lemma 3.9. The event E implies the following inequality:
GfT(Sˆ) ≥
∑
b∈B˜
b6∈B(AT∪AL)
[v(b)− ℓ(P,B)] +
∑
p∈P˜
p 6∈P (MT∪ML)
[ℓ(P,B)− c(p)] .
Proof. Lemma 3.8 shows that given E we have |Pˆ \ P (ML)| ≤ |Bˆ|, hence, Observation 3.3 implies
that OPM assigns at least |Pˆ \P (ML)| users. Additionally, since OPM assigns users of mediators from
ML only after all the assignable users of mediators from M \ (MT ∪ML) are assigned to slots we
get that all the users of Pˆ \P (ML) are assigned by Sˆ given E . On the other hand, Lemma 3.8 also
shows that given E all the users of P˜ \P (MT ) belong to Pˆ , and thus, the users of P˜ \P (MT ∪ML)
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are all assigned by Sˆ. A similar argument shows that the slots of B˜ \B(AT ∪AL) are all assigned
users by Sˆ given E . Finally, observe that E also implies that c(p) ≤ ℓ(P,B) ≤ v(b) for every pair
(p, b) ∈ Sˆ ⊆ Pˆ × Bˆ.
In the rest of the proof we assume that E happens. Consider an ordered pair (p, b) ∈ Sˆ. Then,
the contribution of (p, b) to GfT(Sˆ) is:
v(b)− c(p) = [v(b) − ℓ(P,B)] + [ℓ(P,B)− c(p)] .
By the above discussion, the two terms that appear in brackets on the right hand side of the last
equation are both positive. This allows us to lower bound the gain from trade of Sˆ as follows:
GfT(Sˆ) =
∑
(p,b)∈Sˆ
[v(b) − c(p)] =
∑
(p,b)∈Sˆ
{[v(b) − ℓ(P,B)] + [ℓ(P,B)− c(p)]}
≥
∑
b∈B˜
b6∈B(AT∪AL)
[v(b)− ℓ(P,B)] +
∑
p∈P˜
p 6∈P (MT∪ML)
[ℓ(P,B)− c(p)] .
Corollary 3.10. OPM is at least (1− r − 22r−1 · 3√α− 10e−2/ 3
√
α)-competitive.
Proof. The corollary is trivial when r + 22r−1 · 3√α + 10e−2/ 3
√
α > 1. Thus, we assume in this
proof r + 22r−1 · 3√α + 10e−2/ 3
√
α ≤ 1. For every two sets M ′ ⊆ M and A′ ⊆ A of mediators and
advertisers, respectively, let Val(M ′, A′) denote the expression:
∑
b∈B˜\B(A′)
[v(b)− ℓ(P,B)] +
∑
p∈P˜\P (M ′)
[ℓ(P,B)− c(p)] .
The definition of ℓ(P,B) guarantees that v(b) − ℓ(P,B) ≥ 0 and ℓ(P,B) − c(p) ≥ 0 for every
b ∈ B˜ ⊆ Bo and p ∈ P˜ ⊆ Po. Thus, Val(M ′, A′) ≤ Val(∅,∅) for every two sets M ′ ⊆ M and
A′ ⊆ A. Additionally, it is well-known that the way t is chosen guarantees that every entity of
M ∪ A belongs to T with probability r, independently. A proof of this fact can be found, e.g., as
Lemma A.1 in [14]. Similarly, every entity of M ∪A that does not belong to T is added to L with
probability min{1, 16r−1 · 3√α} = 16r−1 · 3√α, independently. Hence, every user (slot) of P˜ (B˜)
belongs to P˜ \ P (MT ∪ML) (B˜ \B(AT ∪AL)) with probability
(1− r)(1− 16r−1 · 3√α) ≥ 1− r − 16r−1 · 3√α .
Therefore,
E[Val(MT ∪ML, AT ∪AL)] ≥ (1− r − 16r−1 · 3
√
α) ·
∑
b∈B˜
[v(b) − ℓ(P,B)]
+ (1− r − 16r−1 · 3√α) ·
∑
p∈P˜
[ℓ(P,B)− c(b)]
= (1− r − 16r−1 · 3√α) · Val(∅,∅) .
Using Lemma 3.9 and the observation that OPM always produces assignments of non-negative gain
from trade, we now get:
E[GfT(Sˆ)] = Pr[E ] · E[GfT(Sˆ) | E ] + Pr[¬E ] · E[GfT(Sˆ) | ¬E ]
≥ Pr[E ] · E[Val(MT ∪ML, AT ∪AL) | E ]
= E[Val(MT ∪ML, AT ∪AL)]− Pr[¬E ] · E[Val(MT ∪ML, AT ∪AL) | ¬E ]
≥ (1− r − 16r−1 · 3√α) · Val(∅,∅)− Pr[¬E ] · Val(∅,∅)
= [(1− r − 16r−1 · 3√α)− Pr[¬E ]] · Val(∅,∅) . (1)
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Recall that Pr[¬E ] ≤ 10e−2/ 3
√
α by Lemma 3.8. Additionally, Observation 3.7 and the fact that
|P˜ | = |B˜| by definition imply together:
Val(∅,∅) =
∑
b∈B˜
[v(b) − ℓ(P,B)] +
∑
p∈P˜
[ℓ(P,B)− c(p)]
=
∑
b∈B˜
v(b) −
∑
p∈P˜
c(p) ≥ (1− 6r−1 · 3√α) · GfT(Sc(P,A)) .
Plugging the last observations into Inequality (1) gives:
E[GfT(Sˆ)] ≥ [(1− r − 16r−1 · 3√α)− Pr[¬E ]] · Val(∅,∅)
≥ [(1− r − 16r−1 · 3√α)− 10e−2/ 3
√
α] · (1− 6r−1 · 3√α) · GfT(Sc(P,A))
≥ (1− r − 22r−1 · 3√α− 10e−2/ 3
√
α) · GfT(Sc(P,B)) .
The corollary now follows by recalling that Sc(P,B) is the assignment of users from P to slots of
B which maximizes the gain from trade.
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A Proof of Lemma 3.8
In this section we prove Lemma 3.8. Let us begin the proof with the following technical lemma
(this lemma is identical to Lemma 4.9 in [12]. We repeat its proof here for completeness).
Lemma A.1. Given a subset B′ ⊆ Bo and a probability q ∈ [0, 1], let B′[q] be a random subset of
B′ constructed as follows: for every advertiser a ∈ A, independently, with probability q the slots of
advertiser a that belong to B′ appear also in B′[q]. Then, for every β ∈ (0, 1]:
Pr[||B′[q]| − q · |B′|| ≥ βτ ] ≤ 2e−2β2/α .
Similarly, given a subset P ′ ⊆ Po and a probability q ∈ [0, 1], let P ′[q] be a random subset of P ′
constructed as follows: for every mediator m ∈ M , independently, with probability q the users of
mediator m that belong to P ′ appear also in P ′[q]. Then, for every β ∈ (0, 1]:
Pr[||P ′[q]| − q · |P ′|| ≥ βτ ] ≤ 2e−2β2/α .
Proof. We prove the first inequality; the second inequality is analogous. First, observe that the
lemma is trivial when B′ = ∅ since B′ = ∅ implies ||B′[q]| − q · |B′|| = 0 < βτ . Thus, we may
assume in the rest of the proof B′ 6= ∅. For every advertiser a ∈ A, let Xa be an indicator for the
event that slots of a appear in B′[q]. Then:
|B′[q]| =
∑
a∈A
Xa · |B′ ∩B(a)| .
The definition of α implies |B(a)| ≤ ατ for every advertiser a ∈ A, and thus, 0 ≤ |B′ ∩B(a)| ≤ ατ .
Hence, by Hoeffding’s inequality:
Pr[||B′[q]| − q · |B′|| ≥ βτ ] = Pr[||B′[q]| − E[|B′[q]|]| ≥ βτ ] ≤ 2e−
2(βτ)2
∑
a∈A |B
′∩B(a)|2
≤ 2e−
2(βτ)2
ατ ·
∑
a∈A |B
′∩B(a)| = 2e
− 2β2τ
α·|B′| ≤ 2e−
2β2τ
α·|Bo| = 2e−
2β2
α .
Let E ′ be the event that the following inequalities are all true (at the same time):
(i) ||Bo ∩B(AT )| − r · |Bo|| ≤ 3
√
α · τ (iii) ||B˜ ∩B(AT )| − r · |B˜|| ≤ 3
√
α · τ
(ii) ||Po ∩ P (MT )| − r · |Po|| ≤ 3
√
α · τ (iv) ||P˜ ∩ P (MT )| − r · |P˜ || ≤ 3
√
α · τ
Observation A.2. Pr[E ′] ≥ 1− 8e−2/ 3
√
α.
Proof. As explained in the proof of Corollary 3.10, T contains every entity ofM∪A with probability
r, independently. This means that Bo ∩B(AT ), B˜ ∩B(AT ), Po ∩P (MT ) and P˜ ∩P (MT ) have the
same distributions as Bo[r], B˜[r], Po[r] and P˜ [r], respectively. Moreover, by definition, B˜ ⊆ Bo and
P˜ ⊆ Po. Hence, by Lemma A.1, each one of the four inequalities defining E ′ holds with probability
at least 1− 2e−2/ 3
√
α. The observation now follows by the union bound.
Next, we need the following useful observation (this observation is analogous to Observation 4.11
in [12], and both observations share identical proofs. We repeat the proof here for completeness).
Observation A.3. It always holds that:
min{|Po ∩ P (MT )|, |Bo ∩B(AT )|} ≤ |Sc(P (MT ), B(AT ))| ≤ max{|Po ∩ P (MT )|, |Bo ∩B(AT )|} .
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Proof. Let pτ and bτ be the user and slot at location τ of Sc(P,B), respectively. The definition
of a canonical assignment guarantees that we have c(pτ ) < v(bτ ). Additionally, the slots of Bo all
appear in locations 1 to τ of Sc(P,B), and thus, they all have values at least as large as v(bτ ).
Similarly, the users of Po all have costs at most as large as c(pτ ). Combining these observations,
we get: c(p) ≤ c(pτ ) < v(bτ ) ≤ v(b) for every p ∈ Po and b ∈ Bo.
The slots at locations 1 to |Bo∩B(AT )| of Sc(P (MT ), B(AT )) all belong to Bo since Bo contains
the τ slots with the largest values. Similarly, the users at locations 1 to |Po ∩ P (MT )| belong to
Po. Combining both observations, we get that for every location 1 ≤ i ≤ min{|Po ∩ P (MT )|, |Bo ∩
B(AT )|}, the user p′i at location i of Sc(P (MT ), B(AT )) and the slot b′i at this location belong to
Po and Bo, respectively, and thus, c(p
′
i) < v(b
′
i). Hence, by the definition of a canonical assignment,
the pair (p′i, b
′
i) belongs to Sc(P (MT ), B(AT )) for every 1 ≤ i ≤ min{|Po ∩ P (MT )|, |Bo ∩B(AT )|};
which completes the proof of the first inequality we need to prove.
Assume towards a contradiction that the second inequality we need to prove is wrong. In other
words, we assume |Sc(P (MT ), B(AT ))| > max{|Po ∩ P (MT )|, |Bo ∩ B(AT )|}. Let j = max{|Po ∩
P (MT )|, |Bo∩B(AT )|}+1, and let p′j and b′j be the user and slot at location j of Sc(P (MT ), B(AT )),
respectively. Our assumption implies that (p′j , b
′
j) belongs to Sc(P (MT ), B(AT )), and thus, c(p
′
j) <
v(b′j). On the other hand, only the users at locations 1 to |Po ∩ P (MT )| of Sc(P (MT ), B(AT ))
belong to Po, hence, p
′
j does not belong to Po. The user with the lowest cost that does not belong
to Po is the user pτ+1 at location τ + 1 of Sc(P,B). Thus, we get: c(p
′
j) ≥ c(pτ+1). Similarly, we
can also get v(b′j) ≤ v(bτ+1), where bτ+1 is the slot at location τ + 1 of Sc(P,B). Combining the
above inequalities gives:
c(pτ+1) ≤ c(p′j) < v(p′j) ≤ v(bτ+1) ,
which contradicts the fact that pτ+1 is not assigned to bτ+1 by the canonical assignment Sc(P,B).
The next few claims use the last observation to prove a few properties that hold given E ′.
Lemma A.4. The event E ′ implies: Pˆ ⊆ Po and Bˆ ⊆ Bo.
Proof. We prove the first inclusion. The other inclusion is analogous. Observation A.3 and the
definition of E ′ imply:
|Sc(P (MT ), B(AT ))| ≤ max{|Po ∩ P (MT )|, |Bo ∩B(AT )|}
≤ max{r · |Po|+ 3
√
α · τ, r · |Bo|+ 3
√
α · τ} = (r + 3√α)τ .
Using the definition of E ′ again gives:
|Po ∩ P (MT )| ≥ r · |Po| − 3
√
α · τ = (r − 3√α)τ
≥ (1− 2r−1 · 3√α) · (r + 3√α)τ ≥ (1− 2r−1 · 3√α) · |Sc(P (MT ), B(AT ))| ,
which implies, since |Po ∩ P (MT )| is integral,
|Po ∩ P (MT )| ≥ ⌈(1 − 2r−1 · 3
√
α) · |Sc(P (MT ), B(AT ))|⌉ . (2)
If pˆ is a dummy user then Pˆ is empty, which makes the claim Pˆ ⊆ Po trivial. Thus, we may
assume that pˆ is the user at location ⌈(1 − 2r−1 · 3√α) · |Sc(P (MT ), B(AT ))|⌉ of the canonical
assignment Sc(P (MT ), B(AT )). Hence, Inequality (2) and the observation that the users of Po ∩
P (MT ) are the users with the lowest costs in P (MT ) imply together that pˆ belongs to the set
Po ∩ P (MT ) ⊆ Po. On the other hand, Po contains the τ users with the lowest costs. Hence, every
user with a cost lower than c(pˆ) must be in Po since pˆ is in Po. The lemma now follows by observing
that the definition of Pˆ implies c(p) < c(pˆ) for every user p ∈ Pˆ .
17
Corollary A.5. There exists a value ℓ(P,B) independent of the random coins of OPM such that:
• c(p) ≤ ℓ(P,B) ≤ v(b) for every user p ∈ Po and slot b ∈ Bo
• Whenever the event E ′ occurs, c(p) ≤ ℓ(P,B) ≤ v(b) for every user p ∈ Pˆ and slot b ∈ Bˆ.
Proof. Let ℓ(P,B) be the value of the slot at location τ of the canonical assignment Sc(P,B).
Clearly, ℓ(P,B) is independent of the random coins of OPM, as required. Additionally, for every slot
b ∈ Bo it holds that v(b) ≥ ℓ(P,B) since b must be located at some location of Sc(P,B) between 1
and τ . On the other hand, let pτ be the user at location τ of Sc(P,B). Since the size of Sc(P,B)
is τ , pτ must be assigned to the slot at location τ of Sc(P,B), which implies c(pτ ) ≤ ℓ(P,B).7
Moreover, for every user p ∈ Po it holds that c(p) ≤ c(pτ ) ≤ ℓ(P,B) since p must be located at
some location of Sc(P,B) between 1 and τ .
The corollary now follows since Lemma A.4 shows that the event E ′ implies that every user
p ∈ Pˆ belongs also to Po, and every slot b ∈ Bˆ belongs also to Bo.
Lemma A.6. The event E ′ implies: P˜ \ P (MT ) ⊆ Pˆ and B˜ \B(AT ) ⊆ Bˆ.
Proof. We prove the first inclusion. The other inclusion is analogous. The claim about P˜ ∩P (M \
MT ) is trivial when P˜ is empty. Thus, we can assume throughout the proof that P˜ is non-empty.
Observation A.3 and the definition of E ′ imply:
|Sc(P (MT ), B(AT ))| ≥ min{|Po ∩ P (MT )|, |Bo ∩B(AT )|}
≥ min{r · |Po| − 3
√
α · τ, r · |Bo| − 3
√
α · τ} = (r − 3√α)τ .
Recall that α ≥ τ−1, and thus, 3√α · τ ≥ 1. Using this inequality and the definitions of E ′ and P˜
now gives:
|P˜ ∩ P (MT )| ≤ r · |P˜ |+ 3
√
α · τ = r · ⌈(1 − 6r−1 · 3√α)τ⌉+ 3√α · τ ≤ (r − 4 3√α)τ − 1 + 3√α · τ
= (r − 3 3√α)τ − 1 ≤ (1− 2r−1 · 3√α) · (r − 3√α)τ − 1
≤ (1− 2r−1 · 3√α) · |Sc(P (MT ), B(AT ))| − 1 ,
which implies, since |P˜ ∩ P (MT )| is integral,
|P˜ ∩ P (MT )| ≤ ⌈(1− 2r−1 · 3
√
α) · |Sc(P (MT ), B(AT ))|⌉ − 1 (3)
< ⌈(1− 2r−1 · 3√α) · |Sc(P (MT ), B(AT ))|⌉ .
Inequality (3) and the observation that the users of P˜ ∩ P (MT ) are the users with the lowest
costs in P (MT ) imply together that pˆ is a user of P (MT ) which does not belong to P˜ ∩ P (MT ),
and therefore, does not belong to P˜ either. On the other hand, P˜ contains the ⌈(1− 6r−1 · 3√α)τ⌉
users with the lowest costs. Hence, every user p ∈ P˜ has a cost smaller than c(pˆ) since pˆ does not
belong to P˜ . The lemma now follows by observing that the definition of Pˆ implies that p ∈ Pˆ for
every user p ∈ P (M \MT ) obeying c(p) < c(pˆ).
Corollary A.7. The event E ′ implies: −7r−1 · 3√α ·τ ≤ |Pˆ |−(1−r)τ ≤ 3√α ·τ and −7r−1 · 3√α ·τ ≤
|Bˆ| − (1− r)τ ≤ 3√α · τ .
7In fact, we even have c(pτ ) < ℓ(P,B) since the tie-breaking rule defined in Section 2.1 guarantees that the value
of a slot is never equal to the cost of a user.
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Proof. We prove here only the bounds on the size of Pˆ . The bounds on the size of Bˆ are analogous.
By Lemma A.4, Pˆ ⊆ Po. On the other hand, by definition, Pˆ ⊆ P (M \ MT ). Thus, we get:
Pˆ ⊆ Po \ P (MT ). Combining this inclusion with the definition of E ′ gives:
|Pˆ | ≤ |Po \ P (MT )| = |Po| − |Po ∩ P (MT )|
≤ |Po| − [r · |Po| − 3
√
α · τ ] = (1− r) · |Po|+ 3
√
α · τ = (1− r)τ + 3√α · τ .
On the other hand, by Lemma A.6 and the definition of E ′,
|Pˆ | ≥ |P˜ \ P (MT )| = |P˜ | − |P˜ ∩ P (MT )| ≥ |P˜ | − [r · |P˜ |+ 3
√
α · τ ]
= (1− r) · |P˜ | − 3√α · τ ≥ (1− r) · ⌈(1− 6r−1 · 3√α)τ⌉ − 3√α · τ ≥ (1− r)τ − 7r−1 · 3√α · τ .
We can now define the event E referred to by Lemma 3.8. The event E is the event that E ′
happens and in addition the following two inequalities also hold:
(i) |Bˆ \B(AL)| ≤ |Pˆ | (ii) |Pˆ \ P (ML)| ≤ |Bˆ|
We are now ready to prove Lemma 3.8. For ease of the reading, we first repeat the lemma itself.
Lemma 3.8. There exists an event E of probability at least 1 − 10e−2/ 3
√
α such that E implies the
following:
(i) B˜ \B(AT ) ⊆ Bˆ (iii) |Pˆ \ P (ML)| ≤ |Bˆ|
(ii) P˜ \ P (MT ) ⊆ Pˆ (iv) |Bˆ \B(AL)| ≤ |Pˆ |
(v) c(p) ≤ ℓ(P,B) ≤ v(b) for every user p ∈ Pˆ and slot b ∈ Bˆ, where
ℓ(P,B) is a value which is independent of the random coins of OPM
and obeys c(p) ≤ ℓ(P,B) ≤ v(b) for every p ∈ Po and b ∈ Bo.
Proof. By definition, the event E implies the inequalities: |Bˆ\B(AL)| ≤ |Pˆ | and |Pˆ \P (ML)| ≤ |Bˆ|.
Additionally, E implies the event E ′, which, by Corollary A.5 and Lemma A.6, implies the other
things that should follow from E by the lemma. Hence, the only thing left to prove is that the
probability of E is at least 1− 10e−2/ 3
√
α.
If 16r−1 · 3√α ≥ 1, then L contains all the entities arriving after the observation phase, which
implies AL = A \ AT and ML = M \ MT ; and thus, the two inequalities |Bˆ \ B(AL)| ≤ |Pˆ |
and |Pˆ \ P (ML)| ≤ |Bˆ| are trivial in this case. Hence, the events E and E ′ are equivalent when
16r−1 · 3√α ≥ 1, and therefore, the probability of E is at least 1 − 8e−2/ 3
√
α by Observation A.2.
Thus, it is safe to assume in the rest of the proof that 16r−1 · 3√α < 1.
Our plan is to prove the inequality Pr[E | E ′] ≥ 1− 2e−2/ 3
√
α. Notice that this inequality indeed
implies the lemma since it implies:
Pr[E ] = Pr[E ′] · Pr[E | E ′] ≥ (1− 8e−2/ 3
√
α) · (1− 2e−2/ 3
√
α) ≥ 1− 10e−2/ 3
√
α .
The event E ′ is fully determined by the sets MT and AT . Thus, it is enough to show that for
every fixed choice of these sets for which the event E ′ holds, the event E holds with probability at
least 1 − 2e−2/ 3
√
α. Notice that the sets Pˆ and Bˆ become deterministic once we fix the choice of
MT and AT . Hence, either |Bˆ| ≤ |Pˆ |, which implies that the inequality |Bˆ \ B(AL)| ≤ |Pˆ | holds
regardless of the choice of AL, or |Pˆ | ≤ |Bˆ|, which implies that the inequality |Pˆ \ P (ML)| ≤ |Bˆ|
holds regardless of the choice of ML. In both cases, all we need to show is that the other inequality
holds with probability at least 1− 2e−2/ 3
√
α over the random choice of AL and ML.
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Let us assume, without loss of generality, that |Bˆ| ≤ |Pˆ |. By the above discussion, all we need
to prove is that Pr[|Pˆ \ P (ML)| ≤ |Bˆ|] ≥ 1 − 2e−2/ 3
√
α, where the probability is over the random
choice of ML. By Corollary A.7:
Pr[|Pˆ \ P (ML)| > |Bˆ|] ≤ Pr[|Pˆ \ P (ML)| > (1− r)τ − 7r−1 · 3
√
α · τ ]
≤ Pr[|Pˆ \ P (ML)| > (1− 16r−1 · 3
√
α)((1− r)τ + 3√α · τ) + 3√α · τ ]
≤ Pr[|Pˆ \ P (ML)| > (1− 16r−1 · 3
√
α) · |Pˆ |+ 3√α · τ ] .
As explained in the proof of Corollary 3.10, ML contains every mediator of M \MT with probability
16r−1 · 3√α, independently. Hence, Pˆ \ P (ML) has the same distribution as Pˆ [1 − 16r−1 · 3
√
α].
Therefore, by Lemma A.1:
Pr[|Pˆ \ P (ML)| > |Bˆ|] ≤ Pr[|Pˆ \ P (ML)| > (1− 16r−1 · 3
√
α) · |Pˆ |+ 3√α · τ ]
≤ Pr[||Pˆ (1− 16r−1 · 3√α)| − (1− 16r−1 · 3√α) · |Pˆ || > 3√α · τ ]
≤ 2e−2/ 3
√
α .
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